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INCOMING TELETYPE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION:
EUR

FROM: Budapest

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 294, May 2, 6 p.m.

Control 1011
Recd. May 3, 1980
8:43 a.m.

For some months travel conditions in Hungary (REF: 198, May 1) have been easier than reported Legation A-711, September 22, 1949 and there are no rumors or other indication suggesting probable imposition any restrictions in near future.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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ACTION
EUR

Control: 1607
Recd: May 4, 1950
3:42 a.m.

FROM: WARSAW

TO: Secretary of State

No. 821, May 3, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 621, REPEATED MOSCOW 32, BUCHAREST 2, BERN 1021 3,
PRAGA 15, LONDON 29, DEPARTMENT PRESS MOSCOW.

To date no travel control measures applicable to Embassy staff have been issued by Polish Government other than those issued in February last applicable to Service Attaches and officers attached to them (Embassy's despatch 240, February 14). Up to now, American civilian members of staff are free to travel without prior notice to Polish authorities. We are, of course, at times followed and kept under surveillance and when approaching restricted areas warned not to enter but no notice of what areas are restricted has however ever been given Embassy by Polish Government. As no restrictions now applicable to civilian members of staff other than entry at restricted areas, I would not want to see less favorable treatment accorded to civilian members of Polish agencies in States.

Feel contemplated move against Soviet and Rumanian Missions with press release explaining this of reciprocal nature may well have salutary deterrent effect on Polish authorities (Department's 203, 4/1).

GALLMAN

Note: Relayed to Moscow 5/4/50, 2 a.m., JP

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Control 1619
Recd. May 4, 1950
8:58 a.m.

Action
EUR

TO: Secretary of State
FROM: Bucharest
NO: 530, May 3, 10 a.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 530, REPEATED BUCHAREST 24, PRAGA 4, WARSAW 4,
LONDON 5, DEPARTMENT PASS 10600N 25.

I endorse instituting suggested system travel restrictions if applied
to both Soviet and Rumanian officials in US (RTTEL 145, May 1, 6 p.m.).

Area of free movement in Rumania as theoretically defined by restrictions
instituted April 1949 (LRTTEL 388, April 29, 1949 and despatch 187
May 7, 1949) and supplemented July 1949 (RTTEL 542, July 22, 1949) is even
smaller in practice since permits are required to visit supposedly free
mountain resorts of Bistrita and Predoia and Black Sea resort of Eforia
and foreign officials may in fact move freely only within city of Bucharest
and immediate environs, including Lake Walhin to Snagov.

In circumstances free area for Rumanian officials in Washington might
advantageously be restricted to DC and immediate environs with access to
limited nearby resort area. Access of those assigned elsewhere could be
correspondingly limited to surrounding areas.

To go to resort areas theoretically open to US (except Snagov) it is
necessary to make request of Foreign Office at least 24 hours ahead
of time and usually longer and issue is uncertain. Need for such permits
in itself inhibits travel as one must plan in advance and can never
be sure. Nor can one travel on spur of moment.

Since Legation personnel is not allowed to go to Constanta, Rumania's
principal seaport, except to enter or leave country, similarly severe
restrictions might legitimately be applied to Rumanian officials in
Washington. No special treatment in matter of travel permits need be

accorded

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accorded Russian chief of mission, for (unlike situation that, for example, prevailed in Bulgaria) no distinction is made between chiefs of mission and their staffs here.

I suggest that in administering system there need be no concern on Department's part about undue promptness, consistency or efficiency, since dilatory and capricious manner in which Rumanians administer their restrictions aggravates their basic severity. For description of earlier difficulties here I refer to Legation's despatches 331, August 26, 1949 and 410, October 20, 1949. Situation is more rigid now.

I suggest system should be set up in such way application can be flexible and effective "reciprocity" can be assured. With periodic review depending on changes (if any) in manner in which restrictions against us are applied.

While these restrictions relate to travel within country, Department might consider extending them to include something similar to practices here under which we must obtain exit permits to leave country, approval of inventory of effects, special permits to cross restricted territory, and recording in passports of currency being taken out. These formalities are applied here with such chicanery and loss of time that departure becomes a severe strain especially since necessary documents are usually forthcoming only at last moment, however well in advance one begins preparations.

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NOTE: Relayed to Moscow 5/4/50 9:25 a.m. JP

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8-8
Action

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Control: 2515
Recd: May 5, 1960
5:35 p.m.

FROM: Praha

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 651, May 5, 9 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 651, REPEATED MOSCOW 38, BUCHAREST 4, BAIKOV
14, BUDAPEST 13, LONDON TOSCO 71; DEPARTMENT PASS MOSCOW.

Strongly support application travel control measures Soviet Russian
officials US. As travel in Czechoslovakia relatively unrestricted to
date do not recommend application to Czech officials US. Should
Czechoslovakia restrict travel US officials (not improbable) Embassy
hopes Department will be prepared to take reciprocal action at once.

BRIGGS

Note: Relayed to Moscow 5/5/60, 5:40 p.m. MB

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